

these governments are not limited to international relations. They are infamous for crushing domestic insurrections severely, such as the internal revolt in Syria in 1982 in which an estimated 25,000 people were killed in the city of Hama. (O'Brien 739)

Non-democratic countries cannot be assessed using democratic standards. Public policy is only such in name and, in actuality, is the manifestation of one individual's opinion. The dictator's opinion is binding. One problem that stems from such a framework is the inevitable instability of a potential peace process. If the current leader dies or is assassinated, there is no guarantee that the next to seize power will pay any regard to an agreement reached by his predecessor, since there is no system of checks and balances as there is in a democracy. In order for peace to be long-lasting, it must be dependent on more than just an individual's caprice.

Arabia-The Islamic World Review wrote in 1983: "The Palestinian card was played in the past by Nasser, and nowadays by Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad..." (Davis 103-131) The idea of Arab unity is a myth. The 21 Arab countries surrounding Israel refused to absorb their Palestinian-Arab brethren, thereby creating a refugee problem. By maintaining a Palestinian refugee problem, they manipulate the Palestinians in order to sway international sympathy in their favor. They do not welcome Palestinians into their countries, even in Jordan, which is a true Palestinian state with over half of its inhabitants being Palestinian. In Black September 1970, 3,400 Palestinians were killed by Jordanians.

Individuals are being pawned about in a manner that degrades and disregards their rights and needs as people by individuals who call themselves their brothers, but such is the course of history. Arabs are constantly persecuting fellow Arabs. Twenty thousand Syrians were killed by the Syrian army in 1982. (O'Brien 739) One hundred and forty nine Palestinians were murdered by Palestinians in 1991. (*News Brief*) Saddam Hussein gassed the Kurds within his own country. The list goes on and on and one realizes that, given the opportunity, these Muslim leaders would treat Israelis worse.

Before the state of Israel was established in 1948, Jews in Arab countries were violently persecuted, unjustly taxed, and were subject to limited freedoms. (Davis 140-141) The inhumane treatment of Jews led them to flee Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and many other Muslim states by the thousands. They settled in Israel, the only country in the Middle East where they could live securely and with dignity. The treatment of Jews in Arab countries has not improved. An estimated 4,000 Syrian Jews are currently being held hostage in Syria. They do not have the internationally recognized human right to travel freely. If they are permitted to leave for business reasons, they must leave their family and money as insurance of their return. Arab leaders have a history of mistreating Jews within their countries, which provides further evidence as to how they would treat Jews within a Palestinian state.

On a Positive Note

It is possible to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and more precisely between Jews and Muslims, because the current situation is so intolerable to all parties involved. If the Arab countries recognize Israel as a legitimate state and an attempt from all sides is made to socialize the coming generations into understanding and guide them away from hatred, then a lasting peace will be achievable. As with many events throughout history, it is up to the new generation to bring forth change. The mere fact that respective Israeli and Palestinian supporters are now willing to discuss their differences and make an effort to find a common ground on which to base future peace agreements is a big step towards the direction of understanding.

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Making Votes Count: Proportional Representation and Political Equality in Voting Systems

By Michael J. Smith

What is held to be democracy or rule of the people above all is what results from the sort of justice that is agreed to be democratic, which is all having an equal share on the basis of number.

—Aristotle, *Politics* 6.2.9

Representative government, like all possible forms of government, is imperfect. A perfect form of government or of democracy is possible only in a Utopia. In the twentieth

century, even the Athenian system of participatory democracy is impractical. In Athens, each citizen acted as his own representative in the assembly; sections of society or shades of opinion had their voices in the legislature. The population of the great majority of modern political entities, however, is too large for this system. With the exception of a few New England town councils, government structures run by citizens themselves are obsolete. The challenge facing democratic societies today is to construct a form of representative

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government that is both practical and accountable to its citizens. The voting system by which this form of government is elected should be appropriate to the constituency and compatible with accepted standards of political equality. The selection of such a system is a matter of controversy. Until the 1960s and the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, minority groups (mainly African-American and Hispanic) were denied full voting rights. African-Americans were disenfranchised by voter eligibility requirements such as poll taxes and literacy tests; voting systems such as at-large elections and full slate ballot requirements diluted what little voting strength minority communities had.

To redress these widespread violations of civil rights, Congress enacted the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The primary means of redress that this act and related decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts have adopted has been the creation of districts specifically drawn to ensure the election of minority candidates by designing constituencies in which the minority population has a voting majority.

These measures give cause for concern. The egalitarian ideals that are supposed to be the basis of American conceptions of democracy are undermined by the implicit assumption that "for political purposes, race is a citizen's most important characteristic." (Thernstrom 235) The effectiveness of these measures as a means of implementing minority sponsored policies is questionable. Redistricting that creates constituencies with a ethnic voting majority can have the effect of "ghettoization" on minority voting strength and thus diminishing minority political power. Problems have also arisen within multi-racial and multi-ethnic areas where redistricting has to balance the concerns of several minority groups.

A better alternative to these single-member district systems is the use of the single-transferable vote system of proportional representation (STV-PR). This method of voting can protect the voting rights and interests of minority groups without creating a new form of segregation or electoral apartheid.

The Contending Electoral Systems

STV-PR is the modern version of the electoral system proposed by Thomas Hare and promoted by John Stuart Mill in *On Representative Government*. Under this system, each voter casts his ballot by ranking the various candidates by order of preference. Candidates are elected when they reach a certain quota of the vote, determined by the formula:

$$\text{Quota} = \frac{\text{Total Votes}}{\text{Total Seats} + 1} + 1$$

(Lakeman 146-147)

The surplus votes of an elected candidate are transferred to the second preferences marked on the ballots. Candidates who have the lowest total of votes at the end of each count are eliminated and their votes are transferred to other candidates. The process continues until all seats are filled. Hare's proposals (which he termed personal representation, rather than proportional representation) differ from modern STV-PR in that Hare treated the political unit as one entity and did not divide it into constituencies. This version of STV-PR is impractical today. Since Hare's time the voting population in the United Kingdom, for which Hare specifically proposed his system, has multiplied by a factor of thirty. What might have been practical for an electorate of just over one million, would not be for one of 35 million. Contemporary STV-PR systems divide the country or political subdivisions into multi-member constituencies, usually varying from three to seven members.

The first-past-the-post single member district system is the system commonly used in the US and in the United Kingdom, the home of STV-PR. Under this system, the candidate with the greatest number of votes is elected. Elected representatives need not have received the majority of votes. Elections for federal office use this system, and several variations on this basic system have been employed in local

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elections. In a majority vote system, for example, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes to be elected. Runoff elections are held between the two highest polling candidates if there is no majority vote. Legislative officials are elected through a multi-member district system in which the voters cast the same number of ballots as there are seats available. There is no transference of votes between candidates as in STV-PR. One requirement may be that each voter cast all of his/her available ballots in order for his/her vote to be valid.

The at-large election systems consider the entire political subdivision as one voting unit for the election of several candidates. Many southern states used full slate ballot rules to weaken the voting strength of the African-American population. As a result, multi-member and at-large districts have been discredited within the African-American community. (Themstrom 303-305)

Beitz's Theory of Complex Proceduralism

Charles Beitz's theory of political fairness, as set forth in *Political Equality*, provides criteria against which a set of voting procedures of democratic institutions can be used as measures when evaluating its potential for the fair democratic participation of all eligible voters.

Beitz calls his theory complex proceduralism. He views members of a democratic political society as having two distinct roles. They are both policy producers and policy consumers. The mechanisms and institutions of a democratic polity must take into account the interests that arise from both of these aspects of citizenship. Beitz advocates participation by an informed citizenry:

Institutions for participation should be justifiable to each citizen, taking into account the interests that arise from both aspects of citizenship. We should be able to regard the terms of participation as the object of an agreement which it would be reasonable to expect every citizen to accept. Institutions that satisfy this condition can be said to be egalitarian in the deepest sense: being equally justifiable to each of their members, they recognize each person's status as an equal citizen. (Beitz 99)

Beitz identifies three principle regulative interests of citizenship which he contends should be prerequisites for a democratic system: recognition, equitable treatment, and deliberative responsibility.

The regulative interest, or principle of recognition, requires that each citizen be acknowledged as an equal member of the polity. This principle prohibits electoral procedures that

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induce results which unduly favor or discriminate against particular ethnic, racial, religious, or socio-economic groups.

The principle of equitable treatment is designed to protect individual citizens against excessive or oppressive government interference. The particular interests of individuals should not be improperly or unjustly subordinated to the competing interests of other individuals or groups. This

principle, and the interests and procedures it mandates, is designed to complement the democratic mechanisms of participation by "supplement[ing] them with further constraints such as a bill of rights [or] judicial review." (Beitz 110-111) The value of these institutions is born out by the American experience: the judicial process has served as a forum of appeal and a means of redress for those parties who perceive themselves as having been unjustly treated by specific voting procedures.

The regulative interest of deliberative responsibility argues for a democratic institution using a symposium open to the competing views of an informed public in order to resolve political issues. (Beitz 114) Beitz admits the potential for conflict between the two foci of the principle, as institutions open to a broad range of opinion might not maintain optimal conditions for constructive debate. This situation often depends upon local circumstances, however, and therefore can be resolved through local measures.

These conditions serve as criteria by which political institutions and procedures can be assessed. If the institutions and procedures satisfy the criteria, they could not reasonably be rejected by someone holding these interests and concerned with reaching an agreement. This conception is a loose formulation of the theory of social contract. The conditions imposed upon the parties involved in drawing up the terms of participation are considerably less strenuous than those imposed by John Rawls in his interpretation of the social contract in *A Theory of Justice*. The participants would not choose the particular mechanisms and institutions of democratic participation behind a "Veil of Ignorance," and would be allowed to hold and express their respective interests. This is a preferable situation because, as Beitz himself states:

The more informal view facilitates a clearer presentation of the considerations of fair participation and it forces the resolution of conflicts among these considerations into the open. (Beitz 105)

Since voting procedures are directly concerned with problems of social divisiveness, the abstract conditions of Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" which excludes the parties of the agreement from "knowledge of those contingencies which set men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices," would neither be apt or of benefit to real-world conditions in which infra-societal cleavages may deserve consideration. (Rawls 19) Knowledge of one's own racial, ethnic, or religious background and of the general racial, ethnic, and religious make-up of society, would therefore be desirable in determining the conditions of democratic political participation.

Complex Proceduralism and Voting Systems

In his analysis of proportional representation (PR), Beitz attempts to refute the widely held belief that PR is a fairer system of voting and that his theory of complex proceduralism would require PR:

Considerations of political equality or fairness do

not necessarily require adoption of proportional representation. In the general case, one would not be justified in refusing to accept a system of representation simply because it is not PR. Representation by single member territorial districts may satisfy the requirements of fairness, leaving issues involving the representation of groups and access to the ballot to be resolved separately. (Beitz 125)

Beitz accepts that STV-PR complies with the requirements of complex proceduralism. He argues that it neither fulfills these requirements exclusively, nor in a necessarily superior fashion. In fact, STV-PR is more compatible with the strictures of this theory than single-member district systems. All systems of voting involve the sacrifice of ideal values for practical considerations. One must choose between various imperfect systems in order to find the system that combines the virtues of viability and idealism, and STV-PR seems to be the best available compromise.

The key distinguishing characteristic of STV-PR is vote transferability. The value of money lies in its ability to be exchanged; similarly the vote retains its full value by being transferable. (Lakeman 113) The transferability of votes in

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STV-PR ensures that the vast majority of votes will contribute to the election of a candidate. This feature of STV-PR fulfills the principle of recognition. As far as is practical, each individual vote will have had an equal weight in determining the outcome of an election. By contrast, under first-past-the-post systems, the majority of ballots cast at an election might not contribute at all to the election of a candidate.

The mechanisms of STV-PR accord minority groupings a legislative strength roughly equivalent to their numbers. Single-member district systems tend to represent larger groupings in the electorate disproportionately. Perhaps the classic example of this phenomenon was the British general election of 1983. In that election, the Liberal and Social Democrat parties, campaigning under the title of the Alliance, won 25 percent of the vote but only gained 3.6 percent of the seats in the House of Commons. (Kavanagh 97) STV-PR is the more effective system for establishing equitable treatment. It ensures a greater voice for minorities in the legislature and consequently in the government. The scope that STV-PR allows for the representation of minority opinion should also facilitate deliberative responsibility. The range of opinion in a legislature elected under STV-PR would reflect more accurately the views of the electorate than would a legislature elected under single-member district systems.

In his critique of the claims advanced for STV-PR

and his defense of district systems, Beitz equates certain features of both systems and implies that the district equivalents are the superior of the two. Beitz asserts there is a conflict between the systems:

The real differences between these systems involve the stage within the process of election and representation at which the positions are articulated and the framework within which divergent positions are compromised to form workable political coalitions. In proportional representation, these functions take place within the legislature itself under the aegis of parties or groups of legislators representing various constellations of interest; in district representation, they normally occur at an earlier stage—for example, in the selection of party platforms—where there may be substantial competitive incentives to take account of minority interests. (Beitz 137-138)

This stage of debate and compromise is not, however, a universal characteristic of first-past-the-post district systems; American practice seems to be the exception rather than the rule. In British elections, for example, the central party leadership has considerable input and control over candidate selection. Unsavory or undesirable candidates can be barred from selection. (Kavanagh 125-138) Party platforms and the political policy agenda are under the control of the party leadership as well. This suggests that factors other than the voting system, such as the separation of powers between the various branches and the levels of government, may be the cause of the internal policy debate and compromise within political parties that characterizes the American system. Beitz also asserts that district systems can mimic proportionality:

If the geographical distribution of party strength were taken into account in the drawing of constituencies, the discrepancies between the winning parties share of the total vote and its share of the seats in the legislature could be minimized (just as with gerrymandering of the traditional kind it could be maximized). (Beitz 129)

This assertion is unrealistic, undemocratic, and untenable. The likelihood that politicians would design districts that accurately reflect party strength is remote. The temptation to design "traditional" gerrymandered districts is considerable. This idea gives priority to the electoral system over the preferences of the individual citizen or voter. In democracies the electoral system should be a function of the voters. The system should be made to accommodate their preferences, rather than their preferences being made to accommodate the demands of the system. Finally, the likelihood of an impartial delineation of constituency boundaries is remote. The example offered by the efforts of the Districting Commission in New York (as discussed below) demonstrates the folly of this idea.

The 1965 Voting Rights Act: Lessons and Implications

President Lyndon Johnson's remedy for the disenfranchisement of minorities through various voting requirements and procedures was to demand the "goddamnedest, toughest, voting rights bill" conceivable. (Thernstrom 15) The central provision of the act required jurisdictions that were held to violate the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal voting rights (the standard on which violations were judged was the past use of literacy tests to disenfranchise African-Americans and a voter turnout

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of below 50 percent in previous presidential elections) to submit redistricting plans and provisions to change electoral procedures for approval to either the District Court of the District of Columbia or the Attorney General. These jurisdictions were referred to as "covered" jurisdictions. The act succeeded in greatly increasing minority voter registration. In Alabama, African-American voter registration rose from 19.3 percent in March 1965 to 51.6 percent in September 1967. The rise in Mississippi was even more spectacular, from 6.7 percent to 59.8 percent (Thernstrom 17-18) The decisions of the Supreme Court in two particular cases, *Allen v. Board of Elections* and *Gaston County, North Carolina v. US*, expanded the authority of both the judiciary and the federal government into matters previously considered to be under local jurisdictions. *Allen* concerned a change in Mississippi law that permitted counties to switch from a district system to an at-large system for the election of local supervisors and commissioners. Since it submerged single member districts with African-American voting majorities, this change facilitated the possible dilution of the African-American vote into multi-member white majority districts. The decision empowered the federal authorities to ban the introduction of new methods of voting that did not meet with their approval. Because election boundaries must be revised every ten years in the wake of the census, future redistricting plans in districts covered by the provisions of the act would have to be examined by the federal authorities. *Gaston* effectively prohibited the reintroduction of literacy tests by rejecting the idea that literacy tests could be fair. The inferior standard of African-American education due to the policies of segregation invalidated the claims that the new test was color-blind. These decisions brought "covered" jurisdictions firmly under the supervision of the Justice Department. The evolution of this

process during the 1960s and 1970s and the consequent expansion of the powers of the federal authorities placed the Justice Department and the courts in the position of formulating electoral law and policy.

The electoral procedures that the Department of Justice and the judiciary formulated to ensure the voting rights of minorities evolved over the course of several court decisions and preclearance certifications of the Attorney General. One of the key decisions that led to the adoption of the single-member district system was *City of Petersburg, Virginia v. US*. The *Petersburg* decision of the DC district court in 1972 held that the expansion of the city's boundaries, which would effect a drop in the minority population of Petersburg from 56 percent to 47 percent, would have a detrimental effect on the "weight, strength, and power" of the African-American vote. (Thernstrom 138-143) The court endorsed the reasoning of the Attorney General, who had objected to the voting changes that would ensue from the annexation. In order to ensure the voting rights of the minority population, the court ordered that Petersburg switch from its at-large election system to a system of single member districts. (Thernstrom 138-139) The *Petersburg* decision had many implications. It was indicative of the aggressive stance taken by the Justice Department and judiciary on cases of suspected discrimination. No objection to the annexation had been made by any civil rights group; in fact the annexation ordinance had been introduced by a black member of the city council and had been passed unanimously. The motivations behind the boundary change were clearly not racist in intent. The Voting Rights Act, however, had placed the burden of proof on the "covered" district rather than on the Justice Department. "Covered" districts had to prove their innocence of discrimination in voting procedures. *Petersburg*

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had another significant implication. At-large election systems were clearly considered suspect. Only single-member district systems were believed to allow African-Americans the chance to elect candidates in proportion to their numbers. The implied corollary of this was that only African-Americans could represent African-Americans and that the African-American population should be proportionately represented on city councils and legislatures. (Thernstrom 142) The Justice Department's standard for determining whether minority candidates had a fair chance of winning in elections required a minority concentration of at least 65 percent. For district systems to be approved they had to contain a certain proportion of safe minority seats. This standard effectively mandates racial gerrymandering. Although the intentions behind this form of discrimination may be honorable, its implications for American democratic norms are troubling.

Therns from accurately sums up the conflict between the ideal of the American democratic tradition and the consequences that have ensued from the zealous implementation of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act

In theory, no group is entitled by law to proportional representation on a legislative body. Yet both lower courts and the Department of Justice—encouraged by mixed signals from the Supreme Court—rest decisions involving minority voting rights on that unacknowledged standard. A maximum number of safe minority seats—or close to it—has become the rule in an electoral landscape from which at-large voting is being systematically cleared. (Thernstrom 233)

The sad irony is that racial gerrymandering may in fact achieve the opposite of what it intends. The "ghettoization" of the African-American vote diminishes its influence in the general electorate. Representatives of districts other than those that have been expressly marked off for minority representation by the "65 percent" rule would not be dependent on African-American (or other minority) support. The likelihood of their responding sympathetically to the concerns and agenda of minorities is diminished. In practice, racial gerrymandering has paradoxically tended to benefit the Republicans and harm the Democrats, the party that most African-Americans identify with and support. In South Carolina, a state senate redistricting plan created two African-American majority districts by draining African-American voters from four adjacent ones. In the subsequent election, the liberal Democrat incumbents in these four seats were defeated by conservative Republicans. Redistricting of the North Carolina state legislature in 1984 enabled the Republicans to double their share of seats in the legislature. (Thernstrom 234) An African-American judge at a voting rights trial demonstrates the problems and dangers that have ensued from some specific applications of the Voting Rights Act:

I am bitterly opposed to any effort to resegregate me ... How does it help the black community to limit itself to two predominately black wards and be of no consequence in the remainder of the community? Political power is not merely symbolic. (Thernstrom 244)

The alternative voting system that seems to have been overlooked by the Justice Department, the judiciary, and the various legislators is STV-PR. The Voting Rights Act achieved the principle aim of its authors and dramatically increased voter registration among the African-American population in the southern states. The corollary to this goal was to ensure that disenfranchisement was not reintroduced in subtler forms, such as voting mechanisms that diluted the strength of the African-American vote. The procedures adopted by the federal authorities to ensure the fair representation of the minority run counter to the traditions of American democracy

and do not necessarily improve the influence of the minority over the political policy agenda. STV-PR is in keeping with the principles of American democracy. The system of checks and balances established under the Constitution mandates the due representation of the minority. The potential for the minority community to elect representatives of its own choosing is guaranteed under STV-PR. Additionally, the transferable vote mechanism will compel all candidates to be concerned with all groups of a society. The power of the transferable vote in STV-PR ensures that each individual vote has real and not just symbolic value.

STV-PR and New York City Council Redistricting

The recent redistricting of the seats on the New York City Council provides an excellent example of the deficiencies of the single member district system that would be absent if the council elections were held under STV-PR. The revision of the New York City Charter in 1989 required an increase in both the size and powers on the council. A districting

One proposal for the Forty-ninth District in Brooklyn connected two separate parts of the district by the Coney Island Boardwalk. Dissenting member of the Commission, David Wells, pointed out that the district is not "contiguous at high tide."

commission was established to draw up boundaries for the new council constituencies. Since voter turnout in some areas of the city was less than 50 percent at the previous presidential election, the plan required preclearance from the Justice Department. The districts were designed to meet the requirements of the "65 percent" rule, and the commission specifically sought to increase the minority membership on the council. The composition of the "gorgeous mosaic" that is New York, however, made this task extremely difficult. The commission found itself trying to juggle the demands of a multitude of communities for representation on the council. Inevitably some groups complained that they would not be fairly represented by the commission's plan. (*New York Times* 5:2:91 A1.B7) One proposal for the Forty-ninth District in Brooklyn connected two separate parts of the district by the Coney Island Boardwalk. Dissenting member of the Commission, David Wells, pointed out that the district is not "contiguous at high tide." The absurdities that "fair districting" can lead to could hardly be better exemplified.

STV-PR is the obvious remedy to the problem of ensuring fair representation for minorities. Under STV-PR, the various voting groups would have an influence approximate to their numbers. With fewer districts, problems of apportionment and design of district boundaries would be considerably eased. STV-PR is an idea whose time has come. By the time of the next redistricting, legislators should

acknowledge its wisdom and merits.

Conclusions

STV-PR is the fairest system of voting currently in use. Considering the merits of the system, it is surprising that it is not more widely used. The only countries that make use of STV-PR in national elections are the Republic of Ireland and Malta. In the US, it is used only on a very limited basis, for elections to the City Council of Cambridge, MA, and for the New York School Board elections. This system has broad applications in elections to all branches of government. In particular, STV-PR is a highly appropriate system of voting in areas of strong racial or ethnic cleavage. Under STV-PR, minority groups are represented in the legislature in accordance with their voting strength. Minority groups retain the ability to elect the representative of their choice and remain part of the greater community. The importance of transfers in STV-PR further protects minority groups. Transferred votes have frequently been decisive in PR elections. In Irish general elections, voting pacts between the parties play a major role in determining the eventual outcome. Minor parties and minority interests have been able to shape the political agenda through their transferred votes as well as through direct representation. The slogan of the Civil Rights Movement "separate is never equal" should be revived and applied to a campaign for change in current voting practices. The creation of "safe" minority seats creates the danger of marginalizing minority concerns. The danger inherent in "racial gerrymandering" is that it will lead to a progressive disassociation of the various groups that make up our pluralist society. Our democratic institutions should work to bring us together, not to isolate us from each other. Our system of voting should both protect our diversity and increase our sense of community. Measured against these criteria, STV-PR is the superior voting mechanism for ensuring political equality in democratic societies.

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Law School Profile: Georgetown University Law Center

By John Anzalone

Civil liberties are a great heritage for Americans. They protect us against the excesses of totalitarian government and form a vital part of the freedoms to which we urge other nations to aspire. They guarantee Americans freedom of speech, freedom of religion, security against arbitrary police action, and the right to a fair trial. They are not rights which the government gives to people, rather they are rights which the people carved out for themselves when they created the government.

--Edward Bennett Williams
One Man's Freedom

This quotation, chiseled in stone on the entrance way to the newly constructed Edward Bennett Williams Library at Georgetown, echoes the sentiment of a world-class law school with its eye on preserving freedom for Americans as well as people around the globe.

While visiting Georgetown University Law Center (GULC), it is clear that the school prepares its graduates to excel in a wide range of legal careers from private practice to teaching. It is an educational institution dedicated to the principle that law is but the means, and justice is the end. With this principle in mind, Georgetown has built an environment that is at once conducive to the exchange of practical ideas and the pursuit of academic excellence. It brings together an extraordinarily varied group of teachers, scholars, and practitioners, as well as a highly qualified student body—last year 9,500 applications were received for 625 first-year seats—representing a broad range of backgrounds and perspectives.

In recent years, the practice of law has become national and international rather than local, and in increasing

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numbers lawyers have also become legislators, policymakers, and scholars. In these times of profound change, GULC seeks to impart not only tools of the trade, but also to foster reflection and inquiry into the nature of law and the role and responsibility of attorneys. From the first day at Georgetown, an orientation toward public service, law reform, and an emphasis on ethical