

¹⁶ "China's Strike," *The Economist* 16 August 1997: 32.

¹⁷ "Geographical Factors Related to China's Defense Needs," *Defense* January/February Sup. (1982): 63.

¹⁸ **IISS 161.**

¹⁹ Edward Boylon, "The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare," *Comparative Strategy* 3.4 (1982): 380.

²⁰ Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Washington DC: Naval Institute Press, 1994) 90.

²¹ Eftimiades 93.

²² Eftimiades 97.

²³ Joseph Nye, "As China Rises, Must Others Bow?" *The Economist* 27 June 1998: 23.

²⁴ MoD.

²⁵ Greg Cairns, "Chinese Navy Steams Toward Pacific Challenge of US," *Defense News* 22 November (1998): 26.

²⁶ Charles Kupchan, "After Pax America," *International Security* 23.2 (1998): 40.

²⁷ Hua 10.

²⁸ Hua 11.

South Africa's Long Road: A Theoretical Approach

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The manifest change in the relationship between citizen and state in South Africa under apartheid and then reconstruction, post apartheid, is of significant importance to a student of Political Science. Barry Weingast, a political theorist, provides an applicable model for the project as he devises a game-theoretic approach to illustrate the various scenarios and interactions of a state (political officials) and its citizenry. Explaining various interactions among key elements of a society, mainly the state, its citizens, and elite, he establishes a condition in which a breakdown of rule of law is manifested in that society. A breakdown in rule of law impedes progress toward democratic stability, which for the purpose of the argument, is the ideal goal of a society. South Africa in an apartheid state and the transition following serves as an excellent subject to apply the *Transgression* model by Weingast. The model applied to South Africa illustrates how a Democratic state can, in a non-democratic fashion, destroy rule of law and how society and elite overcome such forces and begin recovery down a road leading to a stable democracy with self-enforcing limitations and equality under the state.

APARTHEID: INTENT AND POLICIES

Apartheid, in retrospect was no less than a severely complex political organism comprised of rules, regulations, and legislation aimed at dominating the Black South African's body and mind. The intent of apartheid, established in 1948, was 1) to create a completely segregated society, in keeping with the precepts of Afrikaner politico-religious doctrine and in doing so preserve Afrikaner identity. 2) To secure white political supremacy and its resulting economic privileges from potential internal and external threats: mainly Black domestic threats, and international sentiments on racial rule. And 3) to move the Afrikaner community into a position of social and economic parity with the English speaking community. The apartheid state defines a society ruled by a minority government which imposed rules based on discriminatory ideology that compromised the rights of the Black majority and disregarded Democratic procedures. Apartheid required manipulation of the law and disregard for democratic procedure, both of which, along with the memory of their struggle against it, overshadow the history of the Black South African.¹ South African history

contains visions of discrimination and de facto racism rooted in various legislation and rules that touched every aspect of Black society, work, travel, education, religion, and home life.

The intrusion of apartheid into the everyday lives of Black South Africans was complete and complex by the 1970s. However, the rigid structure reached such a point over time. Malan, president of the National Party government, by 1949 established legislation prohibiting "mixed marriages" and one year later extended this ban on marriages to prohibit all sexual conduct between whites and all other South Africans in the Immorality Act. Within that same year the Population Registration Act was enforced classifying citizens into four racial categories: white, coloured, 'Asiatic' (Indian) and Native (later Bantu or African). "The cornerstone of apartheid was the division of all South Africans by race," a concept achieved by the Population Registration Act². The legislation that would follow heightened and took on more repressive qualities as the government attempted to maintain and control the majority population as a minority.

The all-white government under Verwoerd granted nominal independence to the "homelands" (forced relocation sites) and refused to allow industry to exist there for fear of the accumulation of wealth and the rise of an able bodied proletariat. Instead he encouraged industry to set up on the borders of the homelands to 1) provide for the industries migrant labor and 2) to keep such a production - the intermingling of Blacks and industry - outside of the major cities in South Africa. However, more often than not, those relocated to homelands were consigned to barren areas of land far removed from any employment or resources with only a bus, controlled and regulated by the white state, connecting the distant homeland to the closest city. The homeland policies relocated 3.5 million people making it one of the crudest indications of state power equivalent to genocide.

APARTHEID IN DECLINE AND TRANSITION

By the end of the 1980s the rigid Apartheid state began to break down. In the course of the late 1970s and 1980s the National Party implemented a number of reforms designed to adjust apartheid to changing economic and social circumstances while still retaining a political power. The population responded with resistance organized by Unions and political organizations. These challenges were combated by the state with further repression and by the mid 1980s, a "virtual civil war" existed in many parts of the country.³ The state retained control with military force but the growing international condemnation of apartheid accompanied by the impact of U.N. sanctions began to take its toll on the Apartheid government as it

left the nation isolated from outside traders leaving the nation in a profound economic crisis. The nation found itself in a deadlock. This was finally broken on 2 February 1990 when the new President, F.W. de Klerk, removed the ban on the ANC, PAC and the South African Communist Party and made a commitment to create significant change.

Although the end of apartheid symbolized the end of de facto racism in South Africa, it was still not the end of struggle for the Black South African and for South Africa as a whole. What would lie ahead for the state would be a transition period filled with negotiations between political elite, mainly Mandela and the ANC, and the preexisting government covering many multifaceted issues that plagued the nation left over from apartheid.

ECONOMICS

The economic and social problems of the 1980s had an overwhelming effect on the South African government. The economic course the nation endured throughout the decade transformed the society and slowly chipped away at the rigid Apartheid structure. The ideology of separate development, which worked well in creating economic wealth in the 1950s and 1960s, was no longer in the best interest of the country to enforce. Separate development was a useless concept in capitalist South Africa, where work was in industry and industry was in the cities. Pass Laws serve as an example of an apartheid policy abolished by economic forces when in 1986, the harsh regulation on urban influx of migrant labor was no longer beneficial to South African economy. The Pass Laws were repealed in 1986 in an effort to support employers' needs, to cut the arching costs of the immense bureaucracy and to try and appease international condemnation

The times were changing, therefore, the relationship between state and its citizens were changing. Educating unskilled Black laborers was in practice in South Africa prior to the late 1970s, but it was a concept absent in the minds of the original framers of Apartheid. Therefore, increasing educational resources for Black unskilled workers, the Apartheid state made a concession to economic pressures of the time period. The demand for unskilled labor, grew less and less each year following WWII, and after the 1980s the demand for skilled workers also decreased and as a result the unemployment rate continued to surge. Most Blacks and a growing number of whites were unemployed and unemployable due to their lack of skill and education. Such a condition discouraged foreign investment and created an environment for social disorder.

As observed early in the 1980s the business interest in industry along with the mechanization of white agriculture produced *cheque book farmers*

linked to business interests and marginalized in their own field. Struggling producers and urban employers no longer competed for a limited labor force. The producer was left as the income disparity between he and the industrial employer grew further and further apart. During this time a split was occurring and the cross-class Afrikaner nationalist alliance of the 1940s and 1950s began to splinter. A lower class Afrikaner began to emerge. Increased separation within the race intensified with President Botha's 'total strategy' concept, which was a plan to defuse protest outbreaks and bring economic and political stability to South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. The plan geared toward the business interest and only further indicated the importance of business. The white working class eventually separated from the government to join the Conservative Party under Andrie Treurnicht and in the tricameral elections held in 1987, the white marginalized worker spoke out as they voted in the Conservative Party opposition. The lower class Afrikaner separated further and further from its original party, the party in power, indicating once again a manifest of change in the relationship between state and a citizen group. It was important for White Apartheid South Africa to regain its economic integrity so as to stop indirectly marginalizing the white lower class worker. The State had to maintain the support of its alliance as illustrated by Weingast's model. The slumping economy is a result of many forces none, however, are more influential than the sanctions.

External pressure in the form of sanctions imposed by the UN and individual nations began to severely hurt the South African economy. Sanctions affected jobs, trade surplus, capital from investment, and have left South Africa vulnerable and dependent on foreign activity with a limited group of partners. In 1986, 80 percent of South African import and export were with the U.S., U.K., West Germany, Italy, and Japan. Imports and exports also fell one-third as a result of sanctions. The nation began to feel the bitter effects of economic isolation and for this reason alone, apartheid was to be dismantled. The increased amount of sanctions caused prices to rise and with the loss of national capital and investment, real wages, for those who earn them, fell sharply.⁴

Internationally publicized events such as collapse of local government, riots, and boycotts of white businesses created a worldwide notion of a nation in chaos and on the brink of collapse. However, the state reclaimed its authority. It deployed its military into the rural areas to participate in a civil war with intentions to regain control of the townships, which it accomplished in 1987. Social unrest, in conjunction with economic hardship, pressured de Klerk to create change and remove bans on various anti-apartheid organizations. Perhaps he realized that social resistance could no

longer be combated with more violence and more repression without destroying the state entirely, a realization brought about by changing socio-economic conditions.

By the late 1980s resistance ventured in a new direction. The leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and South African trade unions such as COSATU allied to form the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), which campaigned to challenge segregated facilities such as hospitals, schools, and beaches by calling for mass civil disobedience. MDM's actions were successful in desegregating South Africa, which indicates a triumph of citizen power of state law through a democratic process. "With the collapse of 'total strategy', the government seemed bankrupted of ideas, relying on internal repression and international bravado."⁵ The "total strategy" imposed by President Botha was unable to withstand economic isolation and was defeated by revolt in the mid-1980s - the state empty with ideas. F. W. de Klerk provoked change in his surprising announcement in 1990.

WHO TAKES OVER?

The African National Congress (ANC) gained majority in Government after the 1994 election. However, four years of negotiations occurred prior to any elections. The transfer of power was fragile and complicated. By 1987 "the state had lost the initiative but no one else had the power to seize it."⁶ Various anti-apartheid organizations were still in exile or under imprisonment in 1987 although some negotiations were beginning to matriculate between Mandela and de Klerk. The removal of bans, however, did not mean the sudden deposition of the white government to be replaced by Black South Africans. The ANC felt at the time that the dire conditions of the nation were such that the nation could not survive if the government was entirely replaced by anti-apartheid organizations. "We were not ready. We needed the whites to help run the government," as Kathrada, a personal friend and aid to Nelson Mandela, said to students in 1998 at an event at Columbia University. He further reiterated that the main initiative of the ANC was to maintain government and to not allow for the nation to crumble. Negotiations and compromises among all groups were essential to the recovery process.

The negotiations process following the dismantling of apartheid were formal and serious as the two sides, White government officials and Black elite, attempted to construct a constitution and a new democratic state. There was a delicate balance as the two sides attempted to achieve their agenda in a peaceful way. The negotiations from 1990 to 1993 were under severe scrutiny by the citizenry, and in 1993 the youths began to protest

throughout the country calling for action, not negotiation. The Youth of South Africa spoke out from dissatisfaction on the lack of any meaningful change since 1990. The protesters even ignored Mandela's call for calm and appeared to be abandoning the ANC for the PAC, demanding more radical policy. The government, trying to maintain some control through negotiations and the ANC trying to maintain its support, were pressured by the citizenry to create action. Weingast asserts that the elite risk losing their popularity and thereby, their future if they ignore a citizen consensus.⁷ Both elite and the political officials are accountable to the citizenry. The two negotiating parties finally agreed to hold the first democratic election in 1994 for a mass Constituent assembly in which the major parties would hold joint power. Citizenry has force as shown by its refusal to stand calm as they waited for equality and democracy.

Apartheid meant the violation of rights and the absence of democracy. Therefore, South Africa's transition from that condition involves a concern with civil rights, the process of liberalization and the process of democratization. Du Toit describes the process of liberalization as the extension of individual and civil rights and opening up of political spaces for action.⁸ The goal of any democracy is to have self-enforcing limits on the state which is achieved by allowing citizens to react to violations in concert, which can monitor and enforce a self-limiting government as observed in Weingast. The citizenry needs a mechanism to voice its consensus, mainly representation. The legitimacy of democracy is balanced by the power of the vote. A democratic society requires free election and a citizenry ready and able to defend and challenge the state if the state violates the limitations of state. As Weingast proclaims, democratic stability depends highly on a self-enforcing equilibrium.¹⁶ South African citizenry can produce a self-enforcing equilibrium if it establishes itself as a legitimate force able to combat an out-of-touch sovereign. The dismantling of apartheid and the demand for further change post apartheid reveal a South African citizen as a forceful voice able create change to undo an undesirable transgressing government. South Africa attempts to establish a stable democracy as it adopts true commitment to establish social justice and political equality. South Africa provides a startling illustration of the abuse of power on the behalf of a government. More significant however, the South African story leaves to the world a story of a triumphant people now venturing down the road to political and economic sovereignty.

Notes

¹ Andre Du Toit "Dealing with Privatized and Indirect Apartheid." *Discrimination and the Law in South Africa*, (Pretoria: South Africa, 1994) 25.

² Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid*, (Blackwell: Oxford, 1994) 95.

³ Barry Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *The American Political Science Review* 91.2 (1997): 121.

⁴ Weingast 137.

⁵ Weingast 135.

⁶ Worden 136.

⁷ Weingast 252

⁸ De Toit 25.

¹ Weingast 245.

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