

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH VS. THE PRESS

by Alexander Eule CC '01

The press is often called the unofficial fourth branch of government. The relationship between this fourth branch and its "counterparts" in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our government is a complex one with a long history of both conflict and cooperation. Since the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, the press' relationship with the government has been tense and often contentious. Most scholars agree that today's press is an adversary to government. Meanwhile, over the period since Vietnam and Watergate, the nation's institutions have experienced a dramatic loss in public confidence. Many experts have blamed the adversarial role of the press for the decline in confidence. Some political scientists have questioned this theory, however, and the evidence does not always ascribe blame to the media.

Often lost in the discussion of public confidence in institutions such as government, business and military is confidence in the press itself. Intuitively, this measure of the press seems to be a good tool in measuring the media's continued influence on Americans and its ability to sour the nation on its leading institutions. The following analysis looks at the levels of public confidence in the press and the executive branch since the height of the Watergate scandal in 1973. As measured by three decades of the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys, the interplay of public confidence between press and the executive branch of government has not followed a consistent trend in the recent decades.¹ Rather, confidence has been high and low at several different time periods. Further, these confidence peaks have occurred at different times for press and executive. The confidence picture since 1973 thus does not show one easily decipherable trend. Rather, GSS shows that the relative confidence values between executive and press have undergone three distinct periods: 1) Watergate and its aftermath; 2) the era of the Reagan White House press juggernaut; and 3) Clinton and his media spin. An analysis of each period will help to explain the overall idiosyncratic direction of public confidence, and the institutional changes that have taken place in both the executive branch and within the press. Considering the public's relatively depressed confidence in United States institutions in the 1990s, any method for regaining confidence would better enable institutions to secure the people's trust, while also helping the nation's morale.

BACKGROUND

First, it is important to establish that the press does indeed have a role in setting the nation's political agenda. For if the press has no power in influencing what people think, then there is no reason to assume there should be any type of correlation in confidence levels toward press and government. For many years, the predominant theory of the press' power was based on the "autonomy model," which suggested that the media had little overall impact on the way people formed opinions. Political scientist Robert Entman, however, persuasively argues for an "interdependence model."² He writes, "[P]ublic opinion grows out of an interaction between media messages and what audiences make of them." Previously, scholars believed that "audiences enjoy substantial autonomy in developing their political preferences. More recently, one view argued that the media can control *what* people think, but have no impact on *how* they think. Entman, however, reasons: "If the media (or anyone) can affect what people think about—the information they process—the media can affect their attitudes."³ To conduct his research, Entman combined the results of the 1974 Michigan Content Analysis Study, which "provides extensive information on the front page news and editorial page content of ninety-two newspapers throughout the country," with survey results from University of Michigan Center for Political Studies national poll of 1974 and 1976.⁴ With the data, Entman used regression analysis "to see whether, with all else equal, readers of more liberal or diverse papers exhibit more liberal attitudes and voting behavior."⁵ Entman concludes: 1) editorials, while having little influence on moderates, "do appear to influence those who consider themselves liberals or conservatives, who are more attuned to ideological discourse;" 2) "Most intriguingly, liberal editorial messages seems to influence some conservatives;" 3) editorials were most likely to alter opinions on less familiar issues; 4) Entman concludes that "news diversity influences⁶ members of all three groups, moderates, liberals, and conservatives."⁷

Entman points out that no institution—neither government nor media—can *force* people to think in a certain way. In his research, the author carefully makes the distinction between influence and control: "Influence can be exerted through selection of information, but conclusions cannot be dictated" (349). Thus by controlling the information people receive, the media probably comes closer to determining opinions than any other institution.

Having established that the media do play a significant role in how people think, we have confirmation of what already seemed obvious: the media have significant influence over the public's notions of government, as well as on its confidence in the body as a whole.

It is only in the last three decades that the issue of public confidence has received careful attention in the polls. Beginning in 1966, Harris and Associates began measuring Americans' confidence in the country's major institutions. The same questions are still asked today in the GSS. Interestingly, the country's overall confidence in its national institutions has never

eclipsed the marks Harris first measured in its initial series of questions on confidence.⁸ Previous to these polls, confidence had been growing since its nadir during the Great Depression.⁹ The levels continued to grow until the mid-1960s. The event that signaled the critical turn in American faith in institutions in the 1960s is not a mystery; that decade began the United States' ill-fated military engagement in Vietnam would continue and escalate well into the next decade. The 1960s are thus a turning point in public confidence and with it the institution of American government itself. The significance of Vietnam on the public's faith in government cannot be overstated. To this day, pictures of anti-war demonstrators resonate in the minds of most Americans, even those who were born after the war.

Network television news and its ability to bring the war's bloodshed into living rooms across the nation added a new player to the government's war effort—a player that was not necessarily going to follow the government's lead. The networks were not afraid to use their new power, and they often took positions at odds with the government.¹⁰ Vivid television pictures of war, combined with the press' growing vitriol, created a serious problem for a government that had always taken wartime public support for granted.

After the 1968 Tet Offensive, the media took on a decidedly negative tone. Daniel Hallin in his article, "The Media, the War in Vietnam and Political Support: A Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media" has used empirical evidence to demonstrate the great changes in media coverage that took place before and after the Tet Offensive, the point at which much of the media realized that the war in Vietnam was not going to be a short or easy fight. According to Hallin's data, editorial remarks by journalists went from a favorable ratio of 4-1 to an unfavorable 2-1 ratio against U.S. actions in Southeast Asia, before and after the Tet Offensive, respectively.¹¹ Further, after 1968 the media, which prior to Tet had shaped most of their coverage on the words of administration spokesman, began giving equal time to critics of the administration's war policy.¹² Hallin ultimately argues that his own numbers, in fact, do not support the theory of an oppositional media. Yet, for the purposes of this analysis, his evidence illustrates that the media was responding to changes in public support for the war. Even in wartime, the media were no longer blindly following the official government line. Reporters did continue to rely on public officials for their analysis of the war effort; on the home front, however, the media actively pursued stories about the nation's divisive views about Vietnam.¹³

After Walter Cronkite told the nation in 1968 that the war was not winnable, President Lyndon Johnson believed it had become impossible to recapture public support for the war. Journalist David Halberstam said, "It was the first time in American history a war had been declared over by an anchorman."¹⁴ The media's eagerness to find stories lurking within the government grew throughout the next decade, especially after much of the media initially overlooked Richard Nixon's misdeeds in office.

As for confidence levels, post-Vietnam public confidence levels reached all-time lows by the end of the 1970s. The declining confidence was not going unnoticed. In 1979, near the end of his term, President Jimmy Carter made perhaps the most influential speech of his presidency. In the July television address to the nation, Carter referred to a problem he considered a greater threat to national health than energy shortages or inflation. This fundamental problem, according to Carter was a "crisis of confidence."¹⁵ A lack of confidence, Carter believed, could erode the fabric of society. Oil or no oil, jobs or not, long-range nuclear missiles aside, without the people's confidence in United States' institutions, the nation was in trouble. After the speech, 86 percent of Americans agreed there was a crisis of confidence; Carter eventually squandered this support through a series of costly political blunders.¹⁶ Nevertheless, Carter had made the issue of confidence a major topic of national discussion. In making his speech, Carter was aware, not only of declining overall confidence, but of the president's own significantly reduced public confidence.

METHODOLOGY

In 1983, political scientists Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider published a book dealing with the "crisis of confidence" President Carter had brought to the nation's attention. The book, titled *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind*, relies on two decades of Harris and NORC public confidence data to study the validity of the claim that there was national malaise. Both the Harris and NORC polls asked the same questions about public confidence: "As far as the people running [various] institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?" The response categories were "A Great Deal," "Only Some," and "Hardly Any." For the purposes of their analysis, the authors reason that the only positive response is "A Great Deal." Thus throughout their work, Lipset and Schneider measure having confidence only by those respondents who answered "A Great Deal." The authors admit this terminology is far from perfect. They write, "It may be argued that this question is phrased in such a way as to discourage favorable responses, since the only positive answer available is 'a great deal.'"¹⁷ Still, the poll question is legitimate and is able to show a trend in public confidence; despite the question's wording, in 1966 a majority of Americans had a great deal of confidence in people running "medicine," "the military," "education," "major companies" and the "U.S. Supreme Court."¹⁸ Therefore, at one time the public was willing to lend support to institutions regardless of question's wording. Throughout their work, discussions, charts and graphs are based solely on the "A Great Deal" response.¹⁹ NORC continues to ask the same question today in its GSS. This paper uses that most recent data to analyze the press and executive branch. For consistency, in analyzing the GSS

Cumulative Data from 1972 to 1998, I have also defined positive confidence using the "A Great Deal" response.

WATERGATE AND ITS LEGACY

The story of young *Washington Post* reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward breaking the Watergate story has become folklore in the history of American journalism. An Academy-Award winning movie based on the reporters' own book about their coverage has glorified the reporters' and their battle for democracy. The movie, *All the President's Men*, depicts the major struggle between press and the presidency that has come to symbolize the adversarial press. For a full decade after the scandal, Americans confidence in the media grew while confidence in the executive branch plummeted. *The Washington Post* began its coverage of the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972.²⁰ From that point on, the newspaper continued to chip away at the mysterious Watergate break-in. On August 1, 1972, the first paragraphs of the *Post* story by Woodward and Bernstein read:

A \$25,000 cashier's check, apparently earmarked for President Nixon's re-election campaign, was deposited in April in a bank account of one of the five men arrested in the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters here June 17. The check was made out by a Florida bank to Kenneth H. Dahlberg, the President's campaign finance chairman for the Midwest. Dahlberg said last night that in early April he turned the check over to 'the treasurer of the Committee (for the Re-election of the President) or to Maurice Stans himself.' Stans, formerly secretary of Commerce under Mr. Nixon, is now the finance chief of the President's re-election effort. Dahlberg said he didn't have 'the vaguest idea' how the check got into the bank account of the real estate firm owned by Bernard L. Barker, one of the break-in suspects. Stans could not be reached for comment.²¹

The story reveals the investigative tone *The Washington Post* would take throughout the scandal, until President Richard Nixon resigned—almost exactly two years later—on August 8, 1974. *The Washington Post's* initial coverage of the scandal, though, was unique. Members of the White House press corps had been slow to investigate any possible cover-up. The result was a virtual exclusive for Woodward and Bernstein—both assigned to the local desk—and *The Washington Post*. The White House press corps, according to Mark Rozell had become complacent in their work. More specifically, Rozell writes:

[The reporters] concluded that their mistake had been that they were too reliant on, and trusting of, official sources of information

in the White House. If only they had been more skeptical of official pronouncements and dug beneath the surface of White House activities, many speculated, they might have uncovered the scandal first.²²

Thus, one major legacy of Nixon's corruption was the increased skepticism toward the executive branch. Reporters who had overlooked one of the century's most important stories would make sure never again to allow a president to take advantage of them. Hence, the adversarial press strengthened its resolve and no longer viewed the presidency as a sacrosanct institution. Every president to follow would have to adjust to—and in some cases placate—the skeptical and angered press that Nixon had left behind. In this adjustment, some chief executives have been more successful than others. When Gerald Ford took the oath of office replacing Nixon, the new president faced a severely handicapped executive office. In one year, the public's confidence in the executive branch had fallen by more than half, from a 1973 level of 29.9 percent to 13.9 percent. Ford had little legitimacy; not only had he never been elected to the Oval Office, but the public's lack of confidence gave the replacement president no effective mandate to govern. Additionally, Ford's decision to pardon Nixon for any Watergate wrongdoings did not help the new executive in his efforts to separate himself from the embarrassed Nixon Administration.²³

Carter's election brought new hope to the public. In Carter's first year of office, public confidence in the executive spiked to pre-Watergate levels. Perhaps, the public's mistrust in the executive branch had only been short-lived. Carter's election had eliminated any remnants of the Nixon White House. Amazingly, though, a year after Carter's election, public confidence had fallen to an historic low. The public confidence in the morally strong Carter had dipped below Nixon's previous record low confidence levels. Lipset and Schneider write, "The entire last three years of the Carter administration (1978-1980) seem to be a period aptly characterized by the President's own description: a period of national malaise."²⁴ During that period GSS shows that confidence in the executive branch never rose above 13 percent. Carter had enjoyed a significant honeymoon period, as the surge in executive branch public confidence confirms. Rozell, however, writes that after the honeymoon period Carter never was able to control his image effectively.²⁵

[T]he Carter administration did not successfully manage its media image. For most Americans, political journalists are the most frequently consulted teachers of national politics and of the presidency. Much of what the public knows about the presidency is influenced by national political journalists. The president's public standing, therefore, is significantly influenced by how well the White House succeeds in convincing the press to adopt the

president's symbols and leadership definition.²⁶

Rozell also quotes James Fallows, a former Carter speechwriter, on the president's conception of the press: "[I]t would not occur to Carter very often to ask, 'Well what's the [newspaper] lead going to be about this?' That's not the way his mind works."²⁷ Carter's failure to act strategically hurt him throughout his four years in office. Rozell concludes that Carter's lack of interest in his own image control cost him the ability to persuade Congress, as well his own reelection.

Meanwhile, in contrast to the public confidence in the Carter administration, the press enjoyed a relatively high public confidence level. In their adversarial role, the press was getting the best of the executive branch. Thus, as Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the actor-turned-president faced a major obstacle. The country could ill-afford another four years of ineffective, powerless government. The framers of the Constitution created an executive to bring energy to the federal government. Yet, unless Reagan could find a way to combat the press and project confidence to the American public, that energy would disappear, perhaps for good.

RONALD REAGAN AND HIS WHITE HOUSE PRESS MACHINE

The fact that Reagan was one of the most popular Presidents in recent history should come as no surprise. Reagan's acting experience gave the President the communication skills absolutely essential in the era of the adversarial press and TV presidency. As president, Reagan represented a stark contrast to the Carter's style of presidency. "Reagan may have excelled where Carter fared poorly (image and press relations), but he also may have failed where Carter performed competently (understanding the details of governing and public policies). In contrast to the Reagan White House, the Carter administration demonstrated that presidents who choose not to run a public-relations-oriented White House can expect to receive poor journalistic reviews."²⁸ The changes in public confidence in press and executive during Reagan's term are strong confirmation of the success of Reagan's image control. Between 1981 and 1989, public confidence in the executive for the first time since the Watergate scandal drew even with its confidence in the press. The stabilizing public confidence curve indicates that Reagan was in fact able to gain some control of the media. Rather than letting the press report whatever they chose, Reagan and his press team were now countering reporters' actions with their own adversarial methods. Ultimately, Reagan's aggressive stance was reflected in the public's rising confidence in the executive branch. In the first two years of Reagan's presidency, the public's confidence had increased 5 percent to 17.9 percent; by 1986 confidence reached a high of 21.2 percent, almost 3 percent greater than the public's confidence in the press.

The key to Reagan's success with image control was his recognition that

the media needed him as much as he needed them. In the growing age of television, the president was always a good topic. Even on a night where (there was no real news, the president could always be counted on as a story. In a revised version of his famous work, *Presidential Power*, Richard Neustadt writes that the Reagan White House learned to take advantage of the growing needs of network producers for live coverage:²⁹ "Reagan's aides saw that and made the most of it." In addition to the press office, Reagan's White House took advantage of the Office of Communications, created, ironically, during the Nixon administration. Unlike the Press Office's focus on day-to-day media relations, Reagan effectively used the Office of Communications to promote the White House's long-term message, independent of the media. Regarding Reagan's Office of Communications, Neustadt wrote:

What Reagan's aides set out to do, and did, was literally to 'produce' the President, scripting his daily schedule, words, and pictures to conform to a 'theme of the day/ with nothing else available for correspondents and producers...[And] Reagan's aides made every effort to reduce the competition from their own Administration and the President's own entourage.³⁰

Reagan and his press staff did not hesitate to cut the media off if they were not satisfied with coverage of the administration. A 1983 *New York Times* article read:

President Reagan complained today that news 'leaks' were disrupting work on the budget and other matters and directed that White House staff members get clearance before discussing certain matters with reporters. 'I've had it up to my keister with these leaks,' Mr. Reagan was reported to have told aides today, using a slang word for rump. His comment was given out by David R. Gerger, the White House director of communications.³¹

Finally, Neustadt writes that Reagan was the first president to subordinate his daily schedule to his media relations. Reagan's professional acting background, Neustadt said, was especially important for a president during the 1980's growing television network presence. In the end, Reagan was highly successful with his media tactics. So successful that, at points, media coverage and actual administration policy became virtually indistinguishable.

After a decade-long lack of presidential efficacy, Reagan had given presidents new hope. While his grasp of the issues may not have been as strong as Carter's, Reagan taught politicians that mastering communication techniques was a necessity to achieving legitimacy.

The Reagan-influenced Bush administration demonstrated such skills

throughout the Persian Gulf War. Reporters were frustrated by the government's manipulation.³² The White House was successful in building a consensus around one policy in the war effort. According to Patrick O'Heffernan, by immediately forging the consensus among the governmental actors, Bush sealed off any path for reporters to find 'policy-negative' information. "In the case of highly popular policies like the war against Saddam, the media's ability to report [critical] information is almost eliminated."³³ Bush's ability to convince everyone around him that Desert Storm was a worthy effort, allowed the administration to send a strong message to the media, who was left with little room to find an adversarial position. Thanks in large part to his own capacity to quiet the media during the war, by the end of Desert Storm, public confidence in Bush had jumped to 26.6 percent, the executive's highest public confidence level since 1977.

CLINTON'S SPIN

President Bill Clinton has continued the Reagan tradition by using a strong press staff and Office of Communications. Those staff members have become increasingly important for an administration in which a new scandal is always coming to the fore. In his book *Spin Cycle*, Howard Kurtz—the *Washington Post's* media critic—presents a behind-the-scenes look at the Clinton White House's unending manipulation of the media. Kurtz's reader almost pities the media because of Clinton's merciless tactics. Kurtz depicts a White House-press relationship that has come full circle from the days of Watergate.³⁴ Once again, public confidence tells the story of the evolving relationship between executive and press. In spite of the scandals that have marred the Clinton presidency, public confidence in the executive has begun to rise over the last two years—a period in which Clinton became only the second president to be impeached. The unlikely juxtaposition of impeachment and rising confidence levels is further proof of the importance of mastering the media. Over that same period, confidence in the press, in fact, fell to a record low 9.5 percent.

The Clinton White House has used numerous tactics from stonewalling to sending the president out of the country to avoid confrontations with the press. Kurtz's account highlights many of Clinton and his press team's strategic moves. The four most important methods for controlling the message are: 1) playing by the script only; 2) using the Press Secretary as a shield to deflect negativity from the President. Clinton never delivers bad news, which is the responsibility of another administration member; 3) internal polling of public for White House use only; and 4) carefully controlling access to the president.³⁵ Internal polling has become especially significant for Clinton. Kurtz writes, "When Clinton went before media members to argue this or that position, he was, in most cases, leading where he knew the public would follow."³⁶ Thus, to the public, Clinton has gained an almost prophetic aura. The complex internal polls have thus allowed

presidents always to be a step ahead of the media's coverage of the electorate's own desires. Consequently, Clinton has gained greater public confidence by always appearing to have the public's best interests at hand.

CONCLUSION

The adversarial press spurred by Vietnam and Watergate went unchecked for a decade by presidents who were unsure how to combat the new powerful force. It was not until Ronald Reagan that the White House realized it need not be a helpless player in the media's coverage. Rather, the press needed the President as much he needed them. That realization was the foundation for all of the subsequent changes in the structure of the White House Press Office and Office of Communications. The GSS confidence trend shows a clear progression in the battle between the White House and media. Who is dominant today? GSS shows that after a long decline and losing ground to the press, the White House has begun to regain control of its public image. Strategies begun by Reagan in the early to mid-1980s have improved and kept an ever-hostile media at bay. In large part, the White House's growing public confidence and its advantage over the press, gave Bill Clinton the strength to withstand the intense scrutiny he received during the Monica Lewinsky scandal in 1998-1999. Richard Nixon, conversely, was not so fortunate. He faced a young, adversarial press that soundly defeated an unprepared White House. No president would ever make that mistake again.

Where is the press-executive branch headed? It is likely that just as the White House adjusted to a changing media, the press will do likewise to counter the executive's new advantages. It is not a coincidence that the last two presidents to serve two terms are at their best during public speeches and in front of the cameras. The adversarial press has created a process of natural selection; in today's climate no presidential candidate can win the White House without a strong ability both to placate the media *and* get his or her message across to American voters. For this reason, the White House can no longer be occupied by a media unsavvy president likely to be overshadowed by the press itself.

Eventually, natural selection will also help to create a press once again able to manipulate the White House message. Some journalists still see past the White House spin. Newspapers and networks rely on those reporters to create interesting and exciting—unfortunately, not necessarily accurate—stories. Those journalists who bring excitement, *and revenue*, to their respective media outlets are the ones who will still be covering the White House into the next decade—a period that will undoubtedly unveil another new phase in the ever-contested battle between the press and president. ©

NOTES

¹ Davis, James A., and Tom W. Smith. GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972-1998: [Cumulative File] [Computer file]. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center [producer], 1999. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1999.

² Entman, Robert M. "How the Media Affect What People Think: An Information Processing Approach." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1989), 349.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 352.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 355.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 361.

⁸ Lipset, Seymour Martin and William Schneider. *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind*. New York: The Free Press, 1983, 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁰ Hallin, Daniel C. "The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Public Support: A Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media." *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 41, Issue 1 (Feb. 1984), 2-24).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹² *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁴ Graber, Doris A. *Mass Media and American Politics*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997, 274.

¹⁵ Lipset, Seymour Martin and William Schneider. "The Decline of Confidence in American Institutions." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 98, No. 3 (Autumn 1983), 379-402.

¹⁶ Richard Pious lecture. *The American Presidency*. Columbia University, New York. Oct. 11, 1999.

¹⁷ Lipset and Schneider, 42.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ It is important to note that the mean response for those questioned, provides a different picture of the overall public confidence relationship between press and executive branch. In fact, plotting the mean, shows a fairly continuous positive correlation between press and executive branch. This effect is explainable, at least partially, by those respondents who never have positive feelings for any institution. They are people who remove themselves from the political process. Lipset and Schneider thus chose to deal only with the affirmative response. An argument can be made that this is the only truly important value, as it is likely those people playing an active role in the government are those who answered that they had "A Great Deal" of confidence in an institution. Then it is the size of that group of confident citizens that becomes important. Thus, there is less reason to make a distinction between those answering "Only some" or "Hardly Any." Respondents that give either of the latter answers, in general, are simply not

likely to be involved in government.

²⁰ WashingtonPost.com: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/Watergate/chronology.htm>.

²¹ Bernstein, Carl and Bob Woodward. "Bug Suspect Got Campaign Funds." *The Washington Post*. Tuesday, August 1, 1972; Page A01.

²² Rozell, Mark J. "The Press and the Presidency" *Understanding the Presidency*. James Pfiffner and Roger H. Davidson, eds. New York: Addison Wesley, 2000., p.114.

²³ Lipset and Schneider, 52.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁵ Rozell, Mark J. "President Carter and the Press: Perspectives from White House Communications Advisers." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), 421.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 420.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 422.

²⁸ Rozell, "President Carter and the Press: Perspectives from White House Communications Advisers," 433.

²⁹ Neustadt, Richard. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*. New York: The Free Press, 1990, 274.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 275.

³¹ Weisman, Steven R. "Reagan annoyed by News Leaks, Tells Staff to Limit Press Relations." *The New York Times*. Section A; Page 1, Column 3; National Desk, January 11, 1983.

³² O'Heffernan, Patrick. "A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy." *Taken By Storm*. W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, eds. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

³³ *Ibid.*, 242.

³⁴ Kurtz, Howard. *Spin Cycle: How the White House and the Media Manipulate the News*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998.

³⁵ Kurtz.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 204.