

taken by the United States; Europe and Russia will collaborate with the United States on some levels, mostly non-military ones, but not in all cases. France's refusal to turn over evidence on accused 9/11 plotter Zacarias Moussaoui, for instance, suggests there are serious limits to transatlantic cooperation, and old international disagreements—in this case, over the death penalty—can pop up and prevent the necessary pooling of resources. So far, Europe and Russia have given every indication that they intend to continue to pursue a myopic, selectively anti-terrorist policy based on parochial interests, to the detriment of international security. Their refusal to cooperate more fully with the U.S. will definitely undermine the war on terror. The U.S. should embark on a comprehensive program to help Moscow more effectively monitor its weapons arsenal, but also to generally aid the Russian economy and ease the conversion of defense industries to civilian applications. America cannot buy unanimity in the war on terrorism, however. The extent to which the struggle for civilization is undermined by a lack of international consensus depends on America's willingness to lead the fight, even if it means doing so unilaterally. Our enemies and even some fickle friends will term this kind of leadership "aggression," but that should not deter us.

Whatever America decides to do—most likely, a compromise between coalition-based action and unilateralism—the unipolar paradigm will continue to characterize the international system, which itself will remain a framework in which states are the dominant actors. The devastation wreaked by just nineteen hijackers on Sept. 11 does suggest, however, that individuals have the ability to become important actors in a state-based system, even if in this case they were operatives of the al Qaeda army. Non-state actors, fueled by bin Ladenism and funded privately, are a serious threat to international security. While the primary form of terrorism will be acts committed by QGOs, acts by individuals or small groups unconnected to governments will probably increase. Thus even though relations among states will remain the most common and important type of interaction, the ability of states to dominate the international system will probably decline slightly in the future.

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Guest Essay

JANUS WITH HALO AND SCROLLS:
 RELIGION'S AMBIVALENT RELATIONSHIP
 WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

In his Farewell Address of 1796, President Washington lauded religion as a positive influence on politics: "Of the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports" (Byker 2). Indeed, religious associations in the U.S. and abroad have both promoted and benefited from rights to freedom of conscience, expression, and assembly. Participation in religious organizations contributes to the "social capital" of bonding; it provides a base for civic activism in democratic society.

The bonding within religious communities can be understandably strong because of the experience of shared faith. "For the bulk of humankind," Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen aver, "belief is the most significant of all aspects of life, and the freedoms to maintain, to manifest and to transmit their beliefs to their children, are among the most important claims made by citizens everywhere on their governments" (Boyle and Sheen 1). But the bonding among religious communities does not always survive differences of faith (even within one religion), differences of interest, or of ethnic identity.

This estrangement of humans differentiated by their religion need not inevitably pit religious rights against human solidarity, as Karl Marx insisted it did (Marx). But the claims of religious associations do create an ambivalence in the relationship of organized religion and human rights. John Witte, Director of the Law and Religion Program at Emory University, reminds us that religion can be a formidable force against human freedoms and rights as well as for them. Its teachings and liturgy embrace questions of "the ultimate origin, meaning and purpose of life, of existence" (Witte 31; Juviler,

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"Ambiguities").

One should not be surprised, therefore, to hear from two leading human rights authorities, Henry Steiner and Philip Alston that: "No topic generates more controversy...than relationships between the institutionalization of religious belief or practice and human rights norms" (Steiner and Alston 445). Note that they refer here not to "religion," but to "the institutionalization of religious belief or practice." The controversy begins when religion becomes "organized religion"; that is, communities of adherents with specific interpretations of founding precepts, and representing specific organizational, ethnic, or national interests. Some religious organizations have an impact outside their congregation as human rights defenders and democratic community builders. Their direct or indirect energizing of civil society activism may involve anything from civil rights advocacy to local youth programs, help to the needy, and community revitalization.

On the other side of the picture, religious organizations may become silent assenters or accomplices in discrimination and persecution—as I shall touch on regarding Europe. Farther along this spectrum of violations, religious associations get caught up in ethno-nationalist confrontations, even nurturing a sectarian totalitarianism that bans the practice of all but their own form of religion, as in Saudi Arabia. In the extreme the fundamentalists support and energize warfare and terrorism such as is breaking out in trouble spots around the globe.

Human Rights Defenders and Democratic Community Builders

Religion provides meeting grounds for social interaction, and inspiration for human rights and humanitarian activism. Religion-based organizations such as African Baptist churches (even while Southern Baptists opposed them) Jewish, Buddhist and other humanitarian and rights organizations, Moslem welfare and rights groups, and many Catholic communities in Latin America and elsewhere, have reaffirmed support for human rights and democracy with their contributions to political and social activism, humanitarian assistance and human rights advocacy (Crahan, Joyce, Lean). This writer witnessed such work by Lutheran and Catholic organizations in war-torn El Salvador and neighboring countries in 1984, at considerable risk to themselves. The murder of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero while saying mass at on March 24, 1980, the day after he urged government soldiers to renounce violence against their own people, epitomized the lawlessness and the insecurity of the times (Berryman).

Numerous religion-based humanitarian organizations from World Vision to the American Jewish World Service, the Jewish Agency and Red Crescent Societies protect human rights to life, health, nourishment, educa-

tion, shelter, etc. Religious organizations have provided bases in the U.S. and abroad for joint local efforts at community revitalization toward a more inclusive and active in civil society.¹

Silent Assenters or Accomplices in Discrimination and Persecution

Willy Fautré, director of the Belgian NGO, Human Rights Without Frontiers, and a leading monitor of human rights to freedom of religion and belief, reports that in Europe, a region where discrimination and even persecution of minority religions persist, "very few human rights NGOs deal and want to deal with freedom of religion and belief for reasons I will not analyze here" (Strategies). A witness in hearings before the congressional U.S. Helsinki Commission recalls mentioning the subject of religious rights to Mary Robinson after her appointment as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. She gave "a very vague response. It was not part of her agenda" (Hearing 48).

Do not Steiner and Alston note that: "Important aspects of major religious traditions—canonical text, scholarly exegesis, ministries—provide the foundation for or reinforce, many basic human rights" (Steiner and Alston, 445)? So why turn one's back on a human rights ally? That's where the ambivalent relation with human rights comes in. Steiner and Alston write that: "From another perspective, religious traditions may impinge on human rights, and religious leaders may assert the primacy of their traditions over rights" (445). As already mentioned, religious organizations can render crucial support for democracy and human rights. But they may become passive or active accomplices in the state's discrimination against certain other religions, or in the state's violations of civil rights more generally. In so doing they put self-interest or religious and cultural self-identification, or both, ahead of religious diversity and freedoms.

Europe is no exception to this ambiguity of the divine. Governments and acquiescent religious organizations there both promote and trespass on human rights to freedom of religion and belief. Religious freedom came to liberated Europe after WWII. The countries of Europe, East and West, undertook to protect religious human rights, under various agreements of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the United Nations. Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the European Convention on Human Rights, the countries of Europe are formally bound to respect rights to freedom of conscience and religion, as summed up in Article 18 of the ICCPR, echoing Article 18 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

- 0) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. That right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his **Choice**, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
- (2) No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice (Article 18; McNamara).

The reality is more complicated. Jack Donnelly reminds us that not all even consolidated democracies are necessarily fully "rights-protective regimes." Even firm democratic political communities fall short to the extent that their law and practice exclude the equal protection of minority rights (Donnelly 153-59). Sources of discrimination by and against religious organizations include anti-foreignism, insecurities of identity, vested interests of recognized "traditional" religions, prejudice against "new religions," and chauvinism. Religious communities end up on both sides of the controversy—as supporters of inquiries and discrimination directed against competing "new religions," and as victims of such discrimination. (Boyle and Sheen). Some democratic governments of Europe tolerate, even encourage, discrimination and harassment against minority religions, not only new and controversial religions such as the Scientology Church, but also against older but non-traditional groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses. Examples of Western European countries evincing backlash crop up in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Greece. The Greek Orthodox Church has done its best to prevent the establishment of other organized Christian communities, in a losing battle with freedom advocates up to the level of the European Court of Human Rights (Dept. of State 922-23, 1097-98, 1106-7). Congressman Joseph R. Pitts noted that:

The Parliaments of France, Germany and Belgium have established "Sect Commissions" to investigate "dangerous" cults. In Belgium, the Sect Commission produced a list of 172 dangerous cults including charismatic, evangelical, Catholic, and Protestant groups.

Mr. Pitts is at a loss "to explain how a charismatic evangelical church could be labeled 'dangerous.' In leading nations of the world in which great philosophers and thinkers waxed eloquent on the subject of freedom and individual rights, why is a very legitimate Christian group considered a dangerous cult" (Hearing 3; Besier 38; Kyriazopoulos 536)?

Along with issues of identity, national security and simple prejudice play a part. In France, Enlightenment ideals of free individuals unencumbered by group membership mingle with feelings that groups like Moslems, or members of other religious minorities and "cults," are at once inferior and potentially threatening to the cohesion and security of the secular French nation-state (Fautré, France). Widespread suspicion of Islam fosters support of

Government decrees aimed at banning Moslem girls' wearing of the hijab or headscarf (l'affaire des foulards) under the guise of a prohibition of "ostentatious political and religious symbols" in schools. In this cultural context, anti-cult movements and popular sentiment have resulted in a series of parliamentary inquiries and reports containing generally unsubstantiated accusations of criminal and anti-social behavior by so-called "sects" (Boyle and Sheen 297-300). Neither human rights nor religious organizations seem to have offered effective or particularly prominent resistance to such measures so far.

Discrimination against various charismatic and evangelical churches has been on the rise in Germany. Religions under law—Catholic, Lutheran and Jewish—benefit from special taxes on their members collected by the government. Non-Moslem advocacy for Moslems as religions under law seems notably lacking. Taxing for and even subsidizing religious activities is widespread in Europe. But it brings discrimination over time to the extent that it lags behind the growth of smaller congregations, such as those of the Moslem and some other minority religions in Germany who up to now get no such support. Meanwhile the "new religions" undergo a scrutiny unknown for the larger faiths (Boyle and Sheen 303-313). The charismatic Christlicher Gemeinde Church of Cologne undergoes intense scrutiny of the Committee on Sects and Psycho-Groups of the German Bundestag and local officials, "and has been the target of vandalism and threats of violence" (McNamara 108). The civil services of two German states and most political parties ban members of the Church of Scientology; others have lost jobs because of membership in that church (Little 31).

The situation reviewed here confirms the finding that even in the largest countries of Western Europe, and despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of belief, "it is still possible for some governments to invoke principles of "National unity" or "laicity" in order to inhibit or even to persecute authentic forms of religious or cultural self-definition, especially those practiced or expressed by minorities" (Boyle and Sheen 259).

Tradition and identity meld with churches' organizational self-interest in Greece, Russia and other transitional societies. Cole Durham and other observers associate the repression or limitation of religious freedom and the favoring of a "traditional" religion with crises of identity and regime legitimacy or with a felt threat to power by an organized religious movement or association. A regime of shaky legitimacy "is likely either to exploit the legitimizing power of a dominant religion or to view religion in general as a threat. In either case, religious liberty suffers" (Durham 447).

In the landmark case, *Kokkinakis v Greece* the European Court of Human Rights shared with the world on May 25, 1993, its ruling on the jailing of Jehovah's Witness Mr. Kokkinakis for proselytizing. Mr. Kokkinakis

had already been arrested more than 60 times and served more than five and a half years in jail for proselytizing activity. The court ruled that the Greek government had exceeded its authority under the European Human Rights Convention. It opined that freedom of religion is no threat to democracy, but "one of the foundations of a 'democratic society'" (Gunn 318-391; qtd. in Garay 3). The Kokkinakis case went to the European Court of Human Rights as an episode in the ongoing conflict between a secular and a religious, Orthodox national identity in Greece, a conflict in which the Orthodox church has striven to hold on to its near monopoly of religious freedom (Pollis). It has bitterly opposed the Greek government's effort to end the requirement of religious identity cards.

In Russia, the Orthodox Church is the leading advocate of restraints on "non-traditional" religions—especially competing Christian faiths such as the Catholic Church, various evangelical churches, the Mormons, and even Orthodox congregations which do not recognize the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate, such as the Russian Orthodox Church abroad (Juviler, "Political" 128-32). Generally the worst discrimination occurs in countries with the least religious diversity and the closest to an established religion such as Bulgaria with its Eastern Orthodox religion, or Austria, where Catholicism enjoys a special status (Kanev).

Human rights to religious and cultural freedom clash with other human rights such as women's rights to equality. Numerous examples of such issues over women's rights in the family and society arise in India, Pakistan, Latin America, most Moslem countries, and no few developed, democratic countries (HRW). Women themselves will disagree over what human rights they lack. But religious congregations could do more, some of us would hold, about the banning of women from the priesthood in Catholic and Orthodox churches, and about the relative inaction of religious congregations in the face of such offenses as domestic violence against women and trafficking in women (TomaJlevski).

Religious ethno-nationalists, totalitarians, and terrorists

Serious violations of rights to the freedom of religion and belief occur in the war-torn countries emerging from former Yugoslavia (Mojzes). They provide examples of religious identity as a marker and an instrument in political conflict. Under the late Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman the national constitution labeled Croatia a "Catholic country." Under the former Serbian and Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian forces widely reduced Mosques and Catholic churches to ruins during the conflict in Bosnia. The devastation of Serbian Orthodox churches by Kosovar Albanians persists in Kosovo under UN administration and NATO policing

(Human Rights Watch).

Wherever religion is taken to be a mark of group identity and tradition, it may get caught up in hatreds and victimizations and vengeance—witness the hatred of some Protestant Unionists against Catholics in Northern Ireland. Macedonia has been beset by conflicts between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Slav Macedonians—including attacks on each others' religious shrines. The Balkan tragedies echo Hindu-Moslem carnage in India and disputed Kashmir. Bloody hostility between Moslems and Christians has taken a heavy toll in Indonesia, Nigeria, India; likewise between Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka. Religion in these cases divides humans not only as a primary issue of faith, but also as a mark of identity among competing ethnic groups.

Religion thus has become widely a prisoner of politics, a means to gaining and holding power, as for fundamentalist ayatollahs and mullahs in Iran, or the Taliban when ruling over Afghanistan (Mayer; Rashid) Barnett Rubin notes the lethal melding of religion and politics which occurs when religious organizations "sacrelize" conflicts provoked by self-interested politicians over issues of identity, power, territory and economic assets (Rubin). Extreme and violent religious intolerance, in league with political authorities, has marred the histories of most major faiths. Witness the ruthlessness of the Crusades beginning in 1065, the Catholic Inquisition, and today, the racist-extremist movements and groups employing religious symbolism, ritual, and self-identification. Among such organizations being tracked by the Southern Poverty Law Center have been the Aryan Nations, the Ku Klux Klan, the World Church of the Creator, and The Jewish Defense League (Southern Poverty Law Center).

A religious organization's inclination to view itself as the sole guardian of truth can tempt it to intolerance, "to fight against whatever it defines as deviant, either within its own faith or at its boundaries" (Boyle & Sheen xv). But religious totalitarianism can reach beyond matters of faith and unite a political movement, such as Al Qaeda, for a crusade against iniquitous opponents. Al Qaeda knows no national "boundaries." It has interpreted its own Islamic faith so as to build an extremist ideology. Religion is captured and bent to serve as the energizer of a singularly bellicose interpretation of jihad, which means struggle, but which Al Qaeda represents to mean "holy war" against the infidel. Al Qaeda has carried a global message of deep hatred and anger against the Western infidels, especially the U.S., and all who support them as well (Rashid).

Al Qaeda's reach of terror to as far as the U.S., has exceeded that of the Iranian-backed Shiite terrorists and their patrons, with their narrower national-religious grievances against Israel, Iraq, and the U.S. as supporter of the U.S.-backed Pahlavi dynasty and of Israel. Iran's religious leaders tolerate a

limited elected and more culturally liberal opposition, as well as greater diversity and greater women's independence in public and professional life than the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Saudi Arabia have stood for (Mayer).

Behind Al Qaeda's crusade lies a history of humiliations of Moslems. It includes the betrayal of promised independence by Britain and France after World War One. The abandonment of the anti-Soviet partisans, after the victory over Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1989, left anti-Soviet fighters armed by the U.S. to feel like mere tools of its imperialist policies. In seven years, Al Qaeda, joining with their victorious Afghan allies, the Taliban, had established a base for retribution against the hated infidels (Mehio). Hamid Karzai, leader of Afghanistan's interim government asserts that "Afghanis won't repeat mistakes of supporting the Taliban." Things went wrong in Afghanistan," says Karzai, "because the U.S. walked away. So don't walk away again" (Pomfret).

Before and after Osama bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to support the anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan, a big influence on him was "the charismatic Palestinian radical Abudullah Azzam. Azzam facilitated the flow of young men from Gaza and the West Bank to the battlefields of Afghanistan." Azzam, says Khalidi, "was one of the leading advocates of developing a new kind of political tool, a new kind of Islam with roots in the approach of the Moslem Brotherhood and militant Wahhabi ideas" (Khalidi, qtd. on 17). Bin Laden came to be "no more representative of Islam than Timothy McVeigh is of Christianity." But he shared the quest for moral and personal affirmation he found in the movement, and his call resonated amidst the social and moral chaos of the secular world and the failures of local dictatorships to set their lives straight (Juergensmeyer, qtd. on 357-58).

The flow of recruits to join the Taliban mirrored the flow of oil out of the Middle East. That outflow of oil brought scant reward, nay, ongoing frustration and poverty, amidst the demographics of huge youth cohorts, born into frustrating social and economic dead ends (Sciolino). This aspect of globalization contributed to resentment against the American hegemon. The more so since the hegemon backed local unrepresentative governments for its own purposes (Hoffmann). Those governments include the rulers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Indonesia.

While Bill Moyers wonders—not alone in this—about our attention to economic and social rights needs at home, John le Carre is also not alone in warning that sympathy for those making war on America, like bin Laden, will continue unless "the West has been reawakened to the dilemma of the poor and helpless of the earth." If the U.S. and allies return to their own backyards and turn their backs once again to human misery and repression, "those backyards will never again be the safe havens they once were" (Moyers; le Carre 17).

Conclusion

Religion in all its diversity of faith and contexts is a force that amplifies tendencies both supportive and in violation of human rights. The more human rights generally are sustained, the more supportive of peaceful conflict resolution religion can become. But the position of religious organizations as assenters or accomplices in abridging rights of religious freedom and belief, even in Democratic Europe, helps explain why, in Fautre's words, "very few human rights NGOs deal and want to deal with freedom of religion and belief" (Strategies). And here I have not even touched on the controversy accompanying the lobbying of various religious groups for and against aspects of men's and women's rights in family planning and of marital equality and freedom.

Some keys to global religious extremism and its rejection lie in the reactions to globalization: the process of extending economic, cultural and other interchange around the globe. The legitimacy of governments and of the economics of globalization will depend on the commitment to human rights by its main actors including the USA, both as regards its future alliances, and as regards its commitment to social justice and human dignity globally.

Speaking at Columbia on December 11, 2001, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf of the Al-Farah Mosque in NYC sought from "an all merciful and compassionate God" the guidance "to define a social contract we can all regard as being ours." That contract must include a commitment to human rights and dignity for all, or we shall search for peace in vain while religious fundamentalism turns to violence in the world's troubled places. It seems fitting to close this part about religion, globalization and its discontents by quoting UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: "The forces of envy and despair in today's world are stronger than many of us realized. But they are not invincible. Against them we must bring a message of solidarity, of mutual respect, and above all of hope" (Schmemmann).

Notes

1. See the works cited herein by Di Iulio, Dionne, Gallston, Greenberg, and Lean for a further discussion of this idea.

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